From Freud to Klein

Psychodynamics: Freud to Klein

This paper will critically examine the core psychoanalytic construct of dynamics, comparing Freud’s drive theory with Melanie Klein’s later development of object relations. To begin our approach to the meaning of dynamics, we might start by asking what separates a perspective of the psyche that could be considered ’psychodynamic’ from one that is not. Freud's answer to this question lies in his unconscious drive theory, which assumes that the psyche is dynamic rather than static. Remarking on the conflictual etiology of hysterical symptom formation, he noted, “We do not derive the psychical splitting from an innate incapacity for synthesis on the part of the mental apparatus; we explain it dynamically, from the conflict of opposing mental forces, and recognise it as the outcome of an active struggling on the part of the two psychical groupings against each other [emphasis added]” (Freud, 1910, pp. 25–26). This quote implicates conflicts between the conscious and unconscious elements of the personality and between the unconscious drives themselves.

Freud’s Drive Theory: Assumptions and Meanings

At the heart of Freudian dynamics lies the notion of psychic energy, which he believed was the driving force behind all activity. He conceptualized this energy in the form of what he called the drive, which he assumed exerted physiological and psychological pressure upon the psyche to achieve its aim of energic discharge via satisfaction through an object. Freud conceived of two fundamental drives: the life drive (Eros) and the death drive. Eros seeks to ‘bind together,’ while the death drive aims “to undo connections and so to destroy things... to reduce living things to an inorganic state” (Freud, 1940, p. 31). He named the force of Eros libido and the binding itself cathexis but claimed, "We have no name for that which corresponds to the energy of the death instincts” (1920, p. 53). This is because the force of the death instinct negates representation itself, which we will return to later with Klein’s reconceptualization of the drive in object relations theory.

Freud’s libidinal-economic theory asserts that a ‘drive’ for pleasure exists that seeks satisfaction through an object. He began with a drive for pleasure, which makes the object secondary to the ‘force’ and aim of the drive. He formulated his early notion of polymorphous perversity, in which the object of satisfaction is interchangeable and of secondary importance to the pressure exerted upon the primordial mind by the drive. It is also worth noting that ‘drive’ differs from ‘instinct,’ both of which Freud used, implying that they should not be used interchangeably. However, due to the complicated history of Strachey’s translating these terms to English from the original German and Klein’s adopting the term instinct, I will allow myself the liberty of using them interchangeably, but not without a definitional caveat: Instinkt (instinct in German) is what animals feel (e.g., a squirrel will always seek a nut and cannot find substitute satisfaction for this instinct). Trieb (drive in German) is unique to humans, with possible exceptions for certain other higher-order mammals. Freud’s drive concept asserts that substitute satisfaction for human desires is possible. This is considered ‘polymorphous perversity’: Polymorphous meaning many forms; perversity meaning literally ‘unnatural,’ as in un-animal-instinct-like in that the object of the drive in the dynamic human psyche is prone to the mechanisms of repression, substitution, displacement, and sublimation. 

Freud asserted, “The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego; it is not merely a surface entity but is itself the projection of a surface” (1923, p. 26). He means that the sense of oneself is primarily and always inextricably linked to the body. This is important to the theory of dynamics because it takes as a first principle that the mental processes observable through speech and behavior are foundationally ‘built’ on top of autonomic bodily processes. Freud was a neurologist before he created the field of psychoanalysis, and he was rather frustrated at the limited scope of neuroscience in his day. It wasn’t until the ‘Decade of the Brain’ in the 1990s, with the invention of functional magnetic resonance imaging, that contemporary cognitive-affective neuroscience caught up to many of Freud’s late-19th and early-20th century theorizing as to the basis of the higher cognitive functional anatomy resting literally and figuratively ‘on top’ of the ‘animalistic’ subcortical regions of the brain (Panksepp, 1998; Solms & Turnbull, 2002). Conscious thought and self-narrativity are functions of the higher-order (secondary) processes. Primal affective circuits and the autonomic nervous system are the experiential (primary) processes from which the secondary process functions evolved.

The id, as the most primitive part of the mind, operates entirely under the primary process and seeks the immediate discharge of energy by the pleasure principle. Freud explains that the id “has no organization, produces no collective will, but only a striving to bring about the satisfaction of the instinctual needs subject to the observance of the pleasure principle” (1923, p. 18). Next, we evolved the brain's higher cortical areas, which are central to impulse control and what Freud considers secondary processes. Freud describes the secondary process as governed by the reality principle; thus, "Under the influence of the ego’s instincts of self-preservation, the pleasure principle is replaced by the reality principle. That is to say, the ego learns to postpone satisfaction, to abandon certain sources of pleasure, and to endure the temporary unpleasure of restraining itself, with the long-term aim of achieving pleasure" (1911, p. 219). We can see here how in Freud’s view, the reality principle is built up out of the pleasure principle. He denotes it as basically a reformed pleasure principle when he says it “seems to be only a modification of the pleasure principle, adapted to the requirements of the external world” (Freud, 1920, p. 7). These phenomena are empirically validated through modern neuroanatomy, as previously referenced. The primary and secondary processes are vital mechanisms that reflect the dynamic relationships among the id, ego, and superego. The incessantly pulsating vicissitudes of the id's primary process are what both vitalize and conflict with the main secondary processes of the ego and superego (both of which also contain primary processes).

Clinical Applications: Freud’s Limitations 

We now turn to Freud’s theorizing on the undifferentiated nature of early psychic life, particularly regarding the interplay between erotic and destructive impulses. He writes, “We may picture the initial state of things by supposing that the whole available energy of libido is present in the as yet undifferentiated ego-id and serves to neutralize the destructive impulses which are simultaneously present” (Freud, 1940, p. 32). Note his conjecture of the ‘neutralized destructive impulse’ here; this is a central element of Klein’s reformulation of the early ego, which we will return to later. Freud speculates that the libido stays in this ‘oceanic’ stasis of undifferentiated ego-libido until an outward-directed object relationship—a cathexis of sexual investment—is formed; he called this object libido. Such is his theory of primary narcissism. He says, “Everything that we know about [libido] relates to the ego, in which the whole available amount of libido is at first stored up. We call this state of things absolute, primary narcissism. It continues until the ego begins to cathect the presentations of objects with libido—to change narcissistic libido into object libido” (Freud, 1940, p. 33). This idea—primary narcissism—is central to Freud’s skepticism regarding the possibility of treating the narcissistic disorders (i.e., psychotic and borderline states) in psychoanalysis. Freud’s clinical technique relied heavily on object transference neurosis, which is how patients’ inner conflicts are revealed through their transferences to the analyst. Freud theorized that this relational capacity is contingent upon the patient reaching the Oedipal (triadic) level of psychic functioning. So, when a patient is operating at the oral sadistic or anal sadistic phases (dyadic) of psychosexual development, Freud was at a loss as to how to proceed clinically in psychoanalysis. This marks a jumping-off point for examining Melanie Klein's later theoretical and clinical developments.

Klein’s Object Relations: Meanings, Assumptions, and Modifications

Melanie Klein's exploration of early mental life—influenced by Sandor Ferenczi and Karl Abraham—significantly departed from Freud's model of the earliest affective states. She believed that the early ego “exists from the beginning of post-natal life, though in a rudimentary form and largely lacking coherence” (1957, p. 263). She posited within the early psyche a primitive relationality, somewhat different than Freud’s pure drive energy. While Freud's psycho-economic theories emphasize the cathected structural organization of drives and defenses, Klein’s perspective adds further depth by identifying how prototypical object relations fundamentally shape the psyche from infancy. She outright negates Freud’s notion of primary narcissism, reconceptualizes a proto-ego as existing from the very beginning of life, and assumes that the primary aim of drives is to form and maintain relationships with the psyche constantly seeking to link with objects, her version of Eros.

Central to Klein's approach were her concepts of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions. Klein proposed these developmental ‘positions’ as fundamental modes of experiencing the two drives. In the paranoid-schizoid position, the infant manages the overwhelming affects stemming from the death drive by splitting objects (like the mother) into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ parts. The depressive position, however, represents a developmental shift toward integration and gratitude, where the infant begins to reconcile good and bad aspects of loved figures, experiencing guilt and a desire to repair any harm caused in the paranoid-schizoid position, which Klein describes as “the beginning of concern for others” (1940, p. 344).

The death instinct is central to Klein’s thinking about primitive objects. She claims, “The infant’s anxiety is bound up with the fear of annihilation by persecutory objects, a fear originating from the death instinct” (Klein, 1946, p. 102). This statement contrasts with the ‘neutralized’ death instinct in the oceanic ego-libido state of Freud’s concept of primary narcissism. It shows how paranoia is annihilation anxiety manifest out of a projection of the death instinct, which is then expected to return and persecute the ego.  Klein’s reconsideration that the psyche is always object-related means that there is always access to aggression, and hence conflict, right from the beginning of life. She says, “The absence of conflict in the infant, if such a hypothetical state could be imagined, would deprive him of enrichment of his personality and an important factor in the strengthening of his ego. Conflict, and the need to overcome it, is a fundamental element in creativeness” (1957, p. 258). Klein’s divergence marks a significant break with the mid-20th century classical Freudian/American ego psychology school’s imposition of the ‘conflict-free zone of the ego.’ Klein unreservedly asserts that conflict is endemic to the human condition, and we all feel both love and hate towards our objects. We will return to this in our later discussion of war.

Klein made Freud’s libidinal-economic theories relational by incorporating drive theory into object relations. By perceiving the mind as inherently object-seeking, she opened Freud’s assumptions and meanings of development to a relational turn. She took Freud’s death drive and speculated that it has an emotional and relational tonality. This means that instead of the abstract notion of the constant physiological pressure of a destructive drive, she postulated that the aggressive instinct manifests in relation to an object. This was a nuanced but significant modification to Freudian theory. She took the problem of aggression seriously but located it within a primitive affect that she called primary envy. She says, “Primary envy is directed against the good object, and its manifestations include attacks on the object, its goodness, and the link between self and object” (Klein, 1957, p. 181). This means that Klein’s conception of the primordial mind is neither in a state of ‘primary narcissism’ nor amorphous aggression but is inherently directed toward a primal object, which she called the ‘breast.’ Effectively, this breast is split in phantasy into a good breast and a bad breast. She says, “The good breast [is] derived from the infant’s capacity to invest the first external object with libido. In this way, a good object is established, which loves and protects the self and is loved and protected by the self. This is the basis for trust in one’s own goodness” (1957, p. 261). If the infant is gratified and happy, then the breast—and the ego—is implicitly known as ‘good,’ and gratitude is felt. However, if the infant’s needs go unmet for too long—if the infant feels pain or anxiety— then the breast is perceived as ‘bad,’ withholding, and persecutory, and envy or greed are the primary feelings in relation to the object. Out of this primal state of envy, we have hatred for the other, who is presumed to be the cause of our pain. The essential element for Klein is that this hatred is always object-directed, unlike Freud’s primary narcissistic postulation, where cathexis is located only within the ego and has no initial object relationship, and therefore, aggression is neutralized in the very beginning of life.

Developmental Timelines of the Dual Drives

Some essential elements that we must consider when thinking about the developmental trajectory of the erotic drive are Freud’s notions of incorporation, introjection, and identification. Freud postulated that the mind begins at the mouth. This he called the ‘oral phase’ of psychosexual development, in which the world and pleasure are experienced orally. This fact can be observed in how babies constantly put objects in their mouths. Physical nourishment enters the body through the mouth and travels through the alimentary tract—a primary psychological metaphor for many object relations theorists. Freud posited that the physical fact of orality is the foundation of ego development through the primary process incorporation mechanism. Incorporation is the primordial somatic form of what we later call psychic introjection (also a primary process), which is the gradual ‘taking into’ one’s mind—via implicit memory—the objects or caregivers in the external world. Eventually, the final stage, identification (both a primary and secondary process) with the object, comes into play, in which incorporation and introjection are primary factors. 

Klein agrees with Freud’s formulation of how ego identification develops. However, she sees the primordial ego as being in conjunction with the incorporation phase, already in a prototypical form in the first few days of life, with an inbuilt preconception of a breast primed for love and hate. While Freud’s model of neurotic identification centers around the psychic reality of the Oedipus complex at around four years, Klein reframes psychic development to highlight relational experiences within the entire first year of life, placing the early forms of the Oedipus complex and superego at this age, too. By expanding upon Freud’s idea of the discharge of drive excitation, Klein modified Freud’s formulations of the developmental timeline. As such, it is claimed that she paved the way for clinical work with psychotic and borderline states of mind, which Freud largely dismissed due to the presumed absence of object transferences that are needed for the classical psychoanalytic method with neurotics. By illuminating the pre-Oedipal phases, Klein gave analysts tools to explore previously uncharted territories of primary psychosomatic processes related to the erotic and sadistic oral and anal stages of development. 

Clinical Applications: Phantasy & Projective Identification

Klein’s view of dynamics situated relationships and internal objects at the center of the mind’s structure. She emphasized, “an inner world is being built up in the child's unconscious mind, corresponding to his actual experiences and the impressions he gains from people and the external world, and yet altered by his own phantasies and impulses” (1940, p. 128). An essential result of Klein’s discovery of the inherent object-relatedness of the psyche is her notion of unconscious phantasy, which is the mental representation of instinctual drives. This theoretical turn transformed Freud’s neurobiologically rooted drive theory into the realm of representations within the psyche. These phantasies make up the internal objects in object relations theory. The exchange between the real external objects and primitive feelings of love and hate creates the internal objects. The interplay between these inner and outer factors constitutes nothing less than the embodied mental representation of the innermost core of the ego.

With the concept of phantasy in our arsenal, we can see how Klein’s projection theory develops out of incorporation. She posits that the way the mind works is an intermingling of introjection and projection. Primal affects and developmental levels influence the introjected representation of an actual external person within the mind. This internalized representation results from the primary processes of incorporation and introjection, which is a way of ‘taking into’ oneself something qualitative about another person. These processes underlie the more advanced defense mechanism of identification. Incorporation, introjection, identification, and projection are how the core of the self comprises the relation between intersubjectively created phantasies. 

Freud first explained his idea of projection in his 1894 paper The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence. He saw projection as a primary process resulting from repression, in which the unconscious part of the ego prevents unacceptable erotic and aggressive impulses from entering preconsciousness and consciousness. Klein extended Freud’s projection theory by positing that projection is a fundamental phantasy-based way the psyche works by intermingling inner bodily and outer reality. Out of this came her seminal conceptualization of projective identification, which is how we induce feelings and phantasies in others. Klein saw the mechanism of projective identification as foundational to how pre-verbal experience is communicated. The feelings are, in phantasy, ‘projected into’ the other person, and then the other is induced to identify—based on their own phantasies and introjected objects—with those same projected feelings. Projective identification is foundational to how Klein was able to theorize about working clinically with the primitive pre-verbal states of mind, which are considered the paranoid-schizoid psychotic or borderline levels of mental functioning. 

Contemporary Issues: War and Primary Envy

The early relational dynamics of primary envy resonate powerfully with the dynamics underpinning large-scale national and ethnic conflicts, particularly the destruction seen in war. In war, nations or groups often project their frustrations and unmet needs onto another entity—viewing it as both the possessor of ‘goodness’ (e.g., resources, power, freedom) and the source of deprivation. Just as the infant in the paranoid-schizoid position splits the object into ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ societies at war engage in similar splitting, idealizing their cause while dehumanizing the other side. Underlying envy drives a desire to possess and destroy what the other has so no one can have it—a dynamic aligned with Klein’s primary envy theory. Her concept of the depressive position, where the individual begins to integrate and reconcile an object's ‘good’ and ‘bad’ aspects, offers a potential pathway out of the cycle of envy and destruction. In the context of war, this might involve collective mourning, acknowledgment of shared humanity, and efforts to reconcile guilt to repair the destruction.

Subjective Critique and Implicit Alignments

What does the dynamic psyche want? For Freud, it is drive satisfaction; for Klein, it is protection from annihilation and helplessness. While I still align with Freud’s foundational contributions to the dual drive theory and the dynamic unconscious, I find Klein’s reformulation of these ideas through the lens of early object relations to be more clinically relevant and compelling in practice. Freud’s drive-centered framework is instrumental in conceptualizing the dynamic forces within the mind and body. But Klein’s modifications help me to look for the lived relational realities of patients’ love and hate, not some abstract notion of a ‘death drive.’ Many contemporary psychoanalysts often criticize Klein as being too focused on the intrapsychic world of the patient at the neglect of external reality. However, in many places in her writing, she is unequivocal that what matters most is the relationship between the parent and child or analyst and patient. I find this true in my own experience and of immense value in working with my patients because it opens the door to working dynamically in the here-and-now with the most primitive affects of love and hate we are all endowed with.

References

Freud, S. (1894). The neuro-psychoses of defence. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 3, pp. 41–61). Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1894)

Freud, S. (1910). Five lectures on psycho-analysis. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 11, pp. 9–55). Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1910)

Freud, S. (1911). Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 12, pp. 213–226). Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1911)

Freud, S. (1915). Repression. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 14, pp. 143–158). Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1915)

Freud, S. (1920). Beyond the pleasure principle (J. Strachey, Trans.). International Psychoanalytic Press. (Original work published 1920)

Freud, S. (1923). The ego and the id (J. Riviere, Trans.). Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1923)

Freud, S. (1940). Outline of psychoanalysis (J. Strachey, Trans.). W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1940)

Klein, M. (1940). Mourning and its relation to manic-depressive states. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 21, 125–344.

Klein, M. (1946). Notes on some schizoid mechanisms. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 27, 99–110.

Klein, M. (1957). Envy and gratitude. In M. Klein (Ed.), Envy and gratitude and other works: 1946–1963 (pp. 176–235). Hogarth Press.

Panksepp, J. (1998). Affective neuroscience: The foundations of human and animal emotions. Oxford University Press.

Solms, M., & Turnbull, O. (2002). The brain and the inner world: An introduction to the neuroscience of subjective experience. Other Press.